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The Attorney General’s Power of Certification
Regarding State Mechanisms to Opt-in to Streamlined
Habeas Corpus Procedure
BY: JENNIFER PONDER

A

fter concluding that habeas corpus “has been applied in a crazy-quilt manner with virtually endless
appeals that deny justice to victims and defendants
alike, making a mockery of the judicial system,”1
Congress attempted to solve this problem by granting federal
courts the power to approve individual state mechanisms designed to improve habeas corpus procedure. These state mechanisms would provide counsel to indigent capital prisoners in
post-conviction proceedings in return for creating a faster federal habeas corpus procedure.2 However, Congress determined
that federal courts were not the appropriate body to certify
these state mechanisms3
and instead granted that
power to the Attorney
General.4
This Comment discusses whether Congress correctly granted
the power to certify state
mechanisms for providing counsel to indigent
capital offenders in postconviction proceedings
to the Attorney General.
Critics contend that the
Attorney General has
a conflict of interest in
granting state certification,5 and that the Certification Process for State Claims is too
general and should be revised to include clarification of the
specific criteria necessary for state certification.6 However, this
Comment argues that the Attorney General is the legitimate authority to grant state certification. Furthermore, this Comment
proposes several additions to the expected new regulations
and addresses necessary concerns the Attorney General must
resolve in order to ensure the Certification Process for State
Claims is fair and legitimate.
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court recognized that capital
habeas corpus proceedings had sunk into a quagmire, with several years passing between sentencing and final resolution of a
case.7 In response to this considerable problem, Chief Justice
Rehnquist formed the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas
38

Corpus in Capital Cases (“Powell Committee”) to determine
whether it would be appropriate to speed up federal habeas corpus in circumstances where the petitioner had adequate counsel.8 The Powell Committee produced a report at the end of
its investigation, finding it appropriate to speed up the habeas
corpus process in certain circumstances. This report included
a statutory proposal, suggesting a state opt-in procedure to
streamline habeas corpus proceedings in return for the creation
of a state mechanism to protect the indigent defendant.9 Eight
years after the Powell Committee Report, Congress passed the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),
which streamlined capital federal habeas corpus claims in instances
where a state created
a mechanism that provided competent counsel
for indigent defendants
in post-conviction proceedings. 10 Congress
gave federal courts the
power to determine
whether state mechanisms met these required
standards.11
From 1996 to 2005,
federal courts only approved one state mechanism under the requirements set forth in the AEDPA.12 After
this period of inaction, Congress removed the certification
power from the judiciary and granted it to the Attorney General
via the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.13 In December 2008, serving Attorney General Michael
B. Mukasey14 published the final rule, Certification Process for
State Capital Counsel Systems. Mukasey’s predecessor, Alberto
Gonzalez, wrote the proposed rules, which were eventually incorporated into the final rule.15 The rule responded to public
comments and created the requirements and procedures a state
must undergo to achieve certification.16 Shortly after it went
into effect on January 12, 2009, a district court in California
granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the Attorney General
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from implementing the regulations without at least an additional
thirty-day comment period.17
After the 2008 Presidential election, the new Attorney General, Eric Holder, published a notice of request for comments
to remain open from February 5, 2009 to April 6, 2009.18 After
the conclusion of this comment period, the Attorney General
did not propose a new final rule or even a new set of proposed
requirements for the state mechanisms. In May 2010, the Attorney General proposed a rule to revoke the current Certification
Process for State Capital Counsel Systems.19 The time is now
ripe to prove that the Attorney General is the proper body to
hold the certification power and to suggest what regulations he
should write.
Part I of this Comment briefly discusses English habeas
corpus, the history of American habeas corpus cases with a
focus on capital punishment, and the myriad problems, which
led to the Powell Committee Report. This Part also addresses
that Report and the passage of the AEDPA. Part II critiques
the provision of the AEDPA that gave the certification power
to federal courts, examines the cases during this time, demonstrates why the Judicial Branch is an inappropriate choice
to wield the certification power, and explains why Congress
transferred the authority to grant certifications to the Attorney
General via the Patriot Act.20
Part III analyzes the Certification Process for State Capital
Counsel Systems promulgated on December 11, 2009. Part IV
asserts that the certification power properly rests with the Attorney General instead of the Judicial Branch. Part V discusses
criticisms of the Certification Process for State Capital Counsel
Systems and proposes recommendations for the development
of revised regulations in order to appease critics, ensure that the
states avail themselves of the opt-in process, and most importantly, provide competent counsel for offenders to ensure just
results. Finally, Part VI argues that the Attorney General’s regulations should be accorded Chevron deference so future changes
will be accorded proper respect.

I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
A. HABEAS CORPUS FROM ENGLAND TO THE 1980S
The writ of habeas corpus, sometimes referred to as the
Great Writ,21 originated in England22 and was considered the
“most celebrated writ of English law.”23 English courts employed many different writs of habeas corpus for the swift
administration of justice.24 The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is most similar to what people think of as habeas corpus today.25 This writ would command the person imprisoning
the listed individual to produce him in court, and if the cause of
the person’s imprisonment was unlawful, then he would be reCriminal Law Brief

leased.26 English colonists imported the writ of habeas corpus to
the New World.27 It was considered so integral to their legal system that the Founding Fathers included it in the Constitution.28
The first Congress created the federal court system and granted
the courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus almost
within the same breath, a move that illustrates just how vital
the Founding Fathers considered the writ to the legal system.29
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
legislation and judicial interpretation of the law expanded the
writ of habeas corpus, as well as Supreme Court jurisdiction,
from solely applying to federal law30 to liberally allowing it in
all criminal cases.31 In recent years, the Supreme Court found
that the Constitution invites “a generous construction of the
power of the federal courts to dispense with the writ conformably with common-law practice.”32

B. THE POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT
In June 1988, Chief Justice William Rehnquist created the
Powell Committee in response to the growing problems surrounding habeas corpus and the death penalty.33 The Powell
Committee was composed of attorneys with years of experience and expertise in capital cases and administrative law.34
Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed former Supreme Court
Justice Lewis F. Powell to chair the Committee.35 Chief Justice Rehnquist also commissioned Chief Justice Roney of the
Eleventh Circuit, District Judge Hodges of Florida, and District
Judge Sanders of Texas to participate as members due to their
familiarity with federal review of capital cases and because their
circuits have the largest number of state death row prisoners.36
In addition, Albert M. Pearson, a former defense attorney to
capital defendants and professor at the University of Georgia
School of Law, served as Reporter for the Committee.37 Finally,
William R. Burchill, Jr., General Counsel of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, acted as Secretary.38
Chief Justice Rehnquist charged the Powell Committee
with scrutinizing “‘the necessity and desirability of legislation directed toward avoiding delay and the lack of finality’
in capital cases in which the prisoner had or had been offered
counsel.”39 The Powell Committee met six times, assessed comments it received from interested parties and organizations, and
published its report in September 1989.40 Before reaching any
conclusions, the Powell Committee evaluated responses from
an assortment of commentators ranging from state and federal
prosecutors, legislators, criminal defense attorneys and public
defenders, and groups advocating an end to the death penalty.41
The Powell Committee concluded the “present system of multilayered state and federal appeal and collateral review has led
to piecemeal and repetitious litigation” and created a lack of
finality, virtually eliminating any deterrence the death penalty
would have upon potential criminals.42
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The Powell Committee recognized three serious problems
that needed to be rectified.43 First, the Committee identified a
great deal of unnecessary delay and repetition in federal habeas
appeals cases, which it attributed to a lack of coordination between state and federal courts.44 Prisoners had an incentive to
draw out the legal proceedings with intermittent and repetitive
claims, delaying their deaths for as long as possible.45 Second,
the Powell Committee reported a serious flaw in the existing
system; most indigent capital defendants did not receive counsel
for post-conviction proceedings until shortly before their execution date.46 This delay often resulted in inefficiency, unfairness,
and abrogation of their Constitutional rights.47 Third, the Committee noted a flurry of last minute litigation beginning when
the execution date was set and found these
“eleventh hour petitions” were often meritless, resulting in needless expenditure of
judicial resources.48 In response to these
findings, the Powell Committee drafted
a set of statutory procedures to eliminate
these problems.49

specify competency standards for that counsel,59 and the counsel must not have represented the prisoner in trial or on direct
appeal unless requested by both parties.60 In addition, the state
must request a court order when appointing counsel if the prisoner is indigent, finding that the prisoner rejected counsel with
“an understanding of its legal consequences,” or refusing to
appoint counsel because the prisoner is not indigent.61 Finally,
the incompetence or ineffectiveness of this counsel during state
or federal post-conviction proceedings shall not be grounds for
further relief.62 Therefore, it does not matter whether the counsel
in a specific trial was incompetent, so long as the state has set
competency standards.63
If the state opts in, the prisoner receives an automatic stay
of execution unless he fails to file his federal habeas claim within the time limit,
waives his right to file a writ of habeas corpus, or fails to “make a substantial showing of the denial of a Federal right or is
denied relief in the district court or at any
subsequent stage of review.”64 Once the
state has provided the appropriate mechanism, any application for habeas corpus
relief must be filed within 180 days of the
highest state court affirming the conviction and sentence on direct review.65 The
federal courts can only review claims that
have been raised and addressed on the
merits in state courts, unless the claim was
not raised properly.66
Congress severely limited the amount
of time the federal courts had to evaluate
these applications and motions for habeas
corpus when compared with the previously
nonexistent constraints.67 A district court considering a habeas
motion must enter a final judgment within 180 days after the
application is submitted68 and must give the parties at least 120
days to complete all actions before the case is submitted for a
decision.69 These limitations apply to the initial application for
a writ of habeas corpus, any successive applications, and any
redeterminations of an application if the decision is remanded.70
A court of appeals that hears an appeal from a decision on a writ
of habeas corpus shall file a decision no later than 120 days
after the final brief is submitted.71 Congress also ensured that a
petitioner could not use this appeal process solely to stave off
his execution.72

Therefore, it does

not matter whether

C. THE ANTITERRORISM AND
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT

the counsel in a

specific trial was

Congress considered habeas corpus
reform long before Chief Justice Rehnquist
formed the Powell Committee.50 However,
despite the Powell Committee Report, the
urging of the Chief Justice, and repeated
attempts at reform by Senator Arlen Specter,51 it took a national tragedy to spur
Congress to actually reform habeas corpus
law.52 One year after the Oklahoma City
bombing and seven years after the Powell Committee report,53 Congress included habeas reform in the
AEDPA.54 The AEDPA included a provision focused on special
habeas corpus procedures in capital cases.55 This quid pro quo
approach created an opt-in procedure whereby states could take
advantage of faster federal habeas corpus proceedings with a
limited scope of review in return for providing competent and
adequately compensated attorneys to indigent petitioners in
post-conviction proceedings.56
The first section sets forth the requirements each state must
meet in order to benefit from chapter 154.57 It must establish “a
mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of
reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel” for indigent capital habeas corpus petitioners.58 The state is required to

incompetent, so

long as the state

has set competency
standards.
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II. CRITIQUING THE ANTITERRORISM
AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT
A. JUDICIAL APPROVAL OF STATE OPT-IN
MECHANISMS
During the nine years federal courts held the power to certify state mechanisms, Arizona was the only state to receive
approval.73 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals combined other
federal court standards in order to test Arizona’s appointment
mechanism.74 The Ninth Circuit found that Arizona’s system for
appointing post-conviction attorneys provided mandatory and
binding competency standards, had a statute explicitly setting
compensation for court-appointed lawyers, and provided for the
payment of reasonable litigation expenses.75 However, the court
created what it considered to be a logical extension of the criteria that a state must implement to opt-in; not only must a state
fulfill the stipulations of chapter 154, but it must also follow the
requirements of its mechanism.76 Because Arizona did not meet
its timeliness standard, it could not avail itself of the benefits of
chapter 154.77
California’s sole attempt at certification failed when the
district court held its standards for competent counsel insufficient.78 The district court found California’s competency standards to be recommendations that did not require the Supreme
Court to appoint competent counsel.79 In addition, the district
court determined that counsel must have post-conviction experience in order to be found competent – a requirement California’s mechanism lacked.80
Virginia’s opt-in mechanism failed on several counts.81 The
district court found Virginia’s mechanism insufficient because
its statute did not compel the appointment of counsel and made
no mention of compensation for the appointed counsel.82 Nor
did Virginia establish competency standards for the post-conviction counsel.83

B. THE USA PATRIOT IMPROVEMENT AND
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005
Members of Congress grew frustrated with the federal
courts refusal to approve even a single state’s opt-in mechanism.84 Representative Jeff Flake proposed an amendment to
remove the power to certify state mechanisms from the federal
courts and grant it to the Attorney General in order to “give [s]
tates a real incentive to provide quality counsel to death row
prisoners in [s]tate habeas proceedings.”85 Representative Flake
argued that because the states would be bound by the requirements of chapter 154, especially those relating to time limitations, the federal courts had a conflict of interest in approving
state mechanisms.86 In addition, he implied that some federal
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judges refused to approve state mechanisms because of their
personal animosity toward the death penalty.87
Due to the federal courts refusal to approve mechanisms,
the original habeas problems persisted throughout the nine years
between the passage of the AEDPA and the Patriot Act.88 Over
a four-year span,89 the number of state capital habeas corpus
claims pending in federal district courts increased from 446 to
721 and the percentage of those cases pending for more than
three years grew from 20.2 percent to 46.2 percent.90
Ultimately, Congress determined that its decision to give
federal courts the power to approve state mechanisms was a
mistake,91 and it included an amendment within the Patriot Act
to correct it.92 The most important change this amendment made
was granting the Attorney General the power to certify that a
state had established a mechanism providing counsel to indigent
prisoners in post-conviction proceedings.93 Although Congress
assigned the Attorney General the task of writing regulations to
implement the certification procedure,94 it explicitly limited the
Attorney General’s power to create certification requirements.95
In addition, Congress provided that the Attorney General’s
certification decision be subject to de novo review by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.96 Congress also
shifted the chapter 154 requirements to section 2265, eliminating the unitary review procedure.97 In effect, Congress virtually
eliminated two of the state mechanism criteria: reasonable compensation and actual compliance.98

III. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IS THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY TO WIELD THE
CERTIFICATION POWER
Congress properly reallocated the power to approve state
mechanisms from the federal courts to the Attorney General.
The Attorney General is the more suitable choice for this task
because he does not benefit if a state mechanism is not approved. He is a single authority, so his decisions will promote
consistency between state mechanisms. Further, the states are
more likely to apply for certification, thereby securing indigent
capital prisoners competent counsel and preventing them from
living in a state of uncertainty with their lives hanging in the
balance.
First, unlike the federal courts, the Attorney General does
not have a vested interest in the outcome of a certification decision.99 This new power affects only him by adding to his workload. On the other hand, the federal courts have a great deal
invested in the approval of state mechanisms; if a state can receive the benefits of chapter 154, then the courts must dramatically increase the speed at which they evaluate state prisoners’
federal habeas corpus claims.100 Furthermore, the courts have to
reorder their dockets to shift habeas claims to the forefront, as
41

well as make and write these decisions with uncommon speed.101
The Attorney General is more familiar with the realities of the
state court system than the federal courts, which “have little
responsibility because they are so far removed in time and space
from the circumstances of the crime and the subtleties of the
state proceedings. Accordingly, they have small motive to act
expeditiously or efficiently . . . .”102
Second, the Attorney General is a better authority to grant
certification simply by virtue of being a single unit. When the
courts held the certification power, federal habeas corpus proceedings took longer to litigate than before the AEDPA was
passed.103 When states must go to different courts and circuits
for approval, it is quite possible, if not probable, that state
mechanisms that were approved in one circuit would not be approved in another. The likelihood of a circuit split would create
confusion among state officials and defendants alike, and the
split would not only prolong federal habeas corpus while the
Supreme Court addresses the issue, but it would also flout the
purposes of federal habeas reform: to reduce delay, eliminate
repetitive litigation,104 and ensure finality.105 Additionally, judicial approval of state mechanisms would vary not only between
circuits but among district courts within the same state.106
Third, states are more likely to create mechanisms that appoint counsel to indigent prisoners in post-conviction proceedings now that the Attorney General has the power to certify
these mechanisms. When that power resided with the federal
courts, of the thirty-eight death penalty states only one state’s
mechanisms was approved,107 and that state was still not allowed
to take advantage of the benefits of chapter 154.108 Congress
members purposely shifted the certification responsibility to
the Attorney General so states would have an incentive to provide counsel to indigent prisoners.109 Some critics argue that the
states have little motivation to opt-in to these benefits, regardless of who wields the certification power.110 However, the fact
that states have generally retained their mechanisms, appointing
counsel for post-conviction proceedings even though the courts
refused to grant them the benefits of chapter 154,111 suggests
that if the likelihood of certification were to increase, states
would continue to opt-in to speedier federal habeas corpus.

IV. THE CURRENT RULES REGULATING
THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS
Two years after Congress passed the Patriot Act, Attorney
General Michael Mukasey entered a final rule into the Federal
Register, creating regulations for the certification process of
state mechanisms to appoint counsel.112 However, the Attorney
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General responded to most of the critical comments by stating
that the many ideas proposed “cannot be incorporated into the
rule, because to do so would conflict with the statutory provision that there are no certification requirements beyond those
that chapter 154 expressly states.”113
The Attorney General asserted that the dual objectives of
chapter 154 are to improve “the representation of capital defendants in state post conviction proceedings” and reduce “unnecessarily protracted proceedings in federal habeas corpus review
of state capital cases.”114 The Attorney General outlined the purpose of these regulations, essentially summarizing Congress’s
delegation of the certification power to the Attorney General.115
Although many expected the Attorney General to clarify the
new terms set forth in section 2265,116 he only defined two
terms: “appropriate state official” and “state postconviction
proceedings.”117
The following section explains the requirements a state
must meet in order to earn the benefits of chapter 154.118 These
criteria are almost exactly the same as listed in sections 2262(c)
and (d) and 2265.119 The Attorney General then proffers a series of examples demonstrating how a state could meet or fall
short of the certification requirements.120 For instance, Example
2 illustrates an acceptable mechanism for the appointment of
counsel: “[a] state provides that in any capital case in which a
defendant is found to be indigent, the court shall appoint counsel for state postconviction proceedings from a list of attorneys
available to represent defendants in a manner consistent with 28
U.S.C. 2261(c) and (d).”121
The last section describes the certification process in de122
tail. An appropriate state official must ask for certification
in a request that includes an attestation that the official is the
“‘appropriate state official’ as defined in [section] 26.21” and
an attestation stating that the state has notified the justice or
judge of the state’s highest court of its request for certification.123 Once the Attorney General has received the request for
certification, he must publish a notice in the Federal Register
to that effect, list the “statutes, regulations, rules, policies, and
other authorities” the state is using in its mechanism, and ask
for public comments on the request.124 The Attorney General
must review the state’s application, request additional information from the state, inform it of any problems that need to be
resolved, and consider the public comments.125 If the Attorney
General approves a state’s efforts, he must publish the certification in the Federal Register along with the date the state
mechanism went into effect.126 Once the Attorney General has
approved a state’s mechanism, that certification is final and will
not be reconsidered or revoked.127
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V. CRITICISMS OF THE CURRENT REGULATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE FUTURE
A. CRITICISMS OF THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS FOR
STATE CAPITAL COUNSEL SYSTEMS
Critics have vehemently responded to the current regulations on certification of state mechanisms to appoint counsel
for indigent capital prisoners128 most likely because they fear
that states will obtain the benefits of chapter 154 without fulfilling their obligations to provide competent counsel to indigent defendants.129 One author categorized criticisms into eight
groups.130 The three most important criticisms of the final rule
are: (1) the Attorney General did not define ambiguous terms
and standards;131 (2) states can potentially renege on promises
to provide benefits to indigent prisoners since a decertification
method was not created;132 and (3)
the Attorney General may be biased
in favor of prosecutorial interests
and will therefore approve inadequate mechanisms that do not sufficiently protect defendants.133
It appears that the greatest concern is the Attorney General’s refusal to clarify important terms and
standards found in chapter 154.134
In a comment upon the proposed
rule, the Judicial Conference of the
United States urged the Attorney
General to define the following
terms: “standards of competency,”
“competent counsel,” “compensation of appointed counsel,”
and “reasonable litigation expenses.”135 Critics found these “fatally vague” terms136 troubling because states could be granted
certification even though the counsel provided is insufficient
to meet the requirements of chapter 154.137 This could create
potentially inconsistent and arbitrary decisions,138 and “inject
even more confusion into the certification process.”139
Some critics want the Attorney General to “provide for
ongoing monitoring or oversight of the post-conviction capital
counsel systems of” states that have received certifications and
decertify states if they no longer meet the necessary requirements.140 Critics argue that the lack of supervision or ability to
withdraw certification makes it possible for states to reap the
benefits of chapter 154 without actually funding or administering the mandatory mechanism.141 The public comments expressed a fear, and in one case, a certainty, that the Attorney
General would have a conflict of interest in favor of certifying
state mechanisms.142 Critics drew attention to the fact that the

Attorney General is a prosecutor and therefore would be unable
to separate this role from his task to certify state mechanisms.143

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE REGULATIONS
Within the last year, the Attorney General proposed removing the existing rules regulating the certification process for state
capital counsel systems.144 However, these regulations must be
rewritten due to Congress’s charge to the Attorney General in
the Patriot Act.145 The Attorney General must address the above
criticisms thoughtfully to assure both actual fairness and the
appearance of it.
First, the Attorney General should clarify or provide more
examples of vital terms found in chapter 154, namely “mechanism,” “standards of competency,” “competent counsel,” “reasonable compensation,” and “reasonable litigation expenses.”
The Attorney General should focus a great amount of time and
effort on the term “mechanism” to specify whether the mechanism must be mandatory, whether it can be promulgated by the
state’s legislature or court system,
and to establish who will enforce the
mechanism. Second, the Attorney
General must create some means to
monitor and decertify states that are
not maintaining and enforcing their
post-conviction counsel mechanisms. Unfortunately, the critics fear
that states will not follow through
with their guarantees to indigent defendants is a real possibility, even if
the failure is unintentional.
Third, the Attorney General
must acknowledge the potential for
bias within the final rule and establish strong ethical standards to adhere to in order to ensure that
his decisions are impartial. Otherwise, he will give credence
to claims of bias due to the nature of his role as a prosecutor.
Finally, the Attorney General should include an explanation of
his decision to either grant or deny state certification so that the
state can improve its mechanisms and other states can benefit
from understanding the Attorney General’s reasoning.

However, these regulations
must be rewritten due to

Congress’s charge to the
Attorney General in the
Patriot Act.
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VI. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CHEVRON
DEFERENCE & CONCLUSION
A. CHEVRON, U.S.A. V. NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL
Due to prior criticism of a system enabling speedier habeas corpus and the idea of giving the power of certification
to the Attorney General, it is almost guaranteed that the new
43

regulations will be challenged in court. The traditional test to
determine how much deference an agency regulation deserves
can be found in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.146 In Chevron, the Supreme Court considered whether
an agency had the power to interpret a term found in a statute which delegated to that agency the authority to enforce that
statute.147 The Court created a two-part test that courts must use
to evaluate an agency’s interpretation of the statute it is enforcing.148 First, a court must determine whether Congress has already answered the question at issue.149 However, if the statute
does not address the issue or is ambiguous, the court must rule
upon whether the agency’s interpretation “is based upon a permissible construction of the statute.”150 A court cannot simply
enforce its own interpretation of the statute; it must look to Congressional intent.151
If Congress purposely left room for agency interpretation,
then the court shall view it as “an express delegation of authority
to the agency,” and the court cannot replace its own construction for a “reasonable interpretation made by the administrator
of an agency.”152 At this point in its analysis, the court must
ask whether the administrator’s interpretation of the statute is
reasonable in the context of the program it is implementing.153 If
an “agency construction of a statutory provision [is] fairly conceptualized, [then the challenge] centers on the wisdom of the
agency’s policy.”154 In analyzing an agency’s policy, the question becomes a political issue instead of a judicial task.155 Because this is an issue of administrative and interpretive policy,
the determination belongs with a political body, and the Court
has found that the Attorney General is politically accountable
for his actions.156 In Christensen v. Harris County,157 the Supreme Court clarified what types of agency decisions deserve
Chevron deference. The Court found that “notice-and-comment
rulemaking” and the agency interpretation found in the regulation deserve Chevron deference.158

B. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REGULATIONS SHOULD
BE ACCORDED CHEVRON DEFERENCE
Before Chevron deference can be applied to the Attorney
General’s regulations, the Attorney General must qualify as an
agency.159 The Attorney General is the head of the Department
of Justice. Within the part of the United States Code that describes the organization of agencies, the Department of Justice
is listed as an executive department,160 which in turn, fulfills
the definition of “executive agency.”161 Therefore, the Attorney
General is part of an agency. In addition, the portion covering
administrative procedure defines agency as “each authority of
the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within
or subject to review by another agency.”162 The Attorney General falls within this broad definition and is not excluded by
further clarification within the statute.163 Therefore, the Attor-
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ney General, himself and as part of the Department of Justice,
is an agency.
The Supreme Court essentially ruled that Chevron deference is only applicable to formal rulemaking.164 In Chevron, it
analyzed an agency interpretation derived from the establishment of a formal rule but did not mention other agency constructions of statutes.165 Later, in Christensen v. Harris County,
the Supreme Court determined that only agency regulations
deserve Chevron deference.166 In the only case to address the
regulation made by the Attorney General, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California reviewed the
rulemaking process behind these habeas corpus regulations and
determined the process was formal.167 Furthermore, the Department of Justice complied with and did not protest the court’s
ruling,168 thereby acknowledging that the rulemaking process
was formal.
However, even if the rulemaking process were informal,
the Attorney General’s regulations would receive Chevron
deference “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of such authority.”169 The Patriot
Act clearly delegated power to the Attorney General,170 and he
made the regulations using this power.171 Therefore, regardless
of whether the regulations were created by a formal or informal
rulemaking process, they deserve Chevron deference.

C. CONCLUSION
Now that Congress has granted the Attorney General the
power to certify state mechanisms that provide counsel to indigent capital defendants in post-conviction proceedings, these
prisoners will be assured a better chance at fair results, and the
federal courts will no longer be bogged down by federal habeas
proceedings. These benefits are the perfect illustration of why
the Attorney General is the appropriate body to certify these
state mechanisms and the recommendations contained within
this article would move states toward the creation of fair systems of indigent capital defense.

1
141 CONG. REC. S4590-96 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Specter).
2
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§
2261-2265, 2261(c)(1) (1996) [hereinafter AEDPA], proscribing special
habeas corpus procedures in capital cases when a prisoner is in state
custody and describing how the procedure includes “appointing one or
more counsels to represent the prisoner upon a finding that the prisoner
is indigent and accepted the offer or is unable competently to decide
whether to accept or reject the offer”).
3
152 CONG. REC. S1620-28 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Kyl) (focusing on how section 507 expands and improves the expedited
habeas corpus procedures authorized under chapter 154).
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4

USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 28
U.S.C. § 2261(b) (2006) [hereinafter Patriot Act] (stating that “the Attorney General of the United States certifies that a State has established a
mechanism for providing counsel in post-conviction proceedings”).
5
See Certification Process for State Capital Counsel Systems, 73 Fed.
Reg. 75,327, 75,328 (Dec. 11, 2008) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 26)
(stating that three senators were of the opinion that the proposed rule
would permit the “potential structural bias” of the Attorney General in
favor of certification to override the requirements of the law); see also
Casey C. Kannenberg, Wading Through the Morass of Modern Federal
Habeas Review of State Capital Prisoners’ Claims, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. Rev.
107, 157 (2009) (citing possible bias and political influence in addition
to conflict of interest as “inhibiting the ability of the Attorney General to
fairly and impartially implement the certification process”).
6
Certification Process for State Capital Counsel Systems, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 75,330-32; see also Kannenberg, supra note 5, at 156 (explaining that
tens of thousands of commentators provided reactions to the proposed
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